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Abstract 
This study examines a sample of 222 private firms that opted for going public through a 
reverse takeover transaction. Reverse takeover is a process in which a private firm is 
acquired by a public one in order to obtain its public listing. When the transaction is 
completed, the new enlarged company usually operates under the management and the 
name of the target (private firm). The public company is generally a poor performer and 
expects that with this merger, its performance will be improved. However, apart from 
the significant wealth gains that the shareholders receive during a short period of time 
surrounding the event, negligible improvement in its post-reverse takeover long-term 
financial performance is observed. Hence, while reverse takeover is a less expensive 
and less time-consuming mechanism to go public compared to an IPO, it should be 
considered as a more risky process, concerning the long-term performance of the new 
company. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
At some point of their business activity, the owners of a firm have to take a decision of 
whether their company should go public or remain private. The traditional mechanism 
for a firm to go public is by conducting an Initial Public Offering (IPO). However, this 
process is considered to be quite expensive, due to the high registration and 
underwriting fees and the time consuming to be completed. In later decades, some 
alternative methods were introduced in order to overcome some of these costs and are 
quite fast. One of these mechanisms is analyzed in this study and is called reverse 
takeover (or reverse merger). 
Reverse takeover (RT thereafter) is the process that a private company negotiates with a 
public firm, usually a shell one, to be acquired by the latter and on this way to obtain its 
public listing. This type of merger is called reverse because the new entity formed is 
based on the private company, in other words, on the target. Usually, this back-door 
listing is preferred by small capitalization firms that either do not fulfill the 
requirements to go public through an IPO, or they look for a cheaper way to go public. 
On the other hand, the public entity is a shell company that its shares are thinly traded 
and it usually has not assets or operations and is mainly financially distressed. 
Although, the public company seems to be used as a vehicle for the private company to 
obtain a public listing, it has two main motives to participate in this deal. First, it 
expects that through the new entity, it will have the opportunity to recover and develop 
its operations again. Second, it is a good opportunity for the shareholders to recover 
some losses from their investments. The payment of this transaction is usually made in 
stock or in combination of cash and stock. Since both companies have motivations for 
this type of merger, the deal attitude is considered to be friendly 
RT is a technique that grows in popularity year after year. Almost 3,255 private 
companies have been involved in a RT transaction worldwide1. Thus, a number of 
questions are raised through the RT process:  
What factors drive these companies to choose a RT to go public instead of an IPO or an 
alternative mechanism. 
                                                          
1 Source: Data from Thomson one, in 10/09/2012 
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 What is the prevailing regulation of RTs. 
 What makes RT deals to create wealth effects for the shareholders of the public entity. 
 What is the post-merger performance of the new entity.  
In order to answer these questions, a sample of 222 reverse takeovers that took place in 
Europe from 1991 to 2011 is created. Hence, this study describes the reverse takeover 
process, the characteristics and the motivations of the firms that participate in a RT. 
Moreover, its main purpose is to explore the wealth effects of RTs. Finally, it 
investigates post-RT operating and stock performance.  
Reverse takeovers is a topic that is relatively unexplored worldwide. In fact, there is no 
study so far that investigates the value relevance of RTs in Europe and we believe that 
the current study fills this gap. We believe that the results of the study might be of 
interest to shareholders of firms that participate in RTs, analysts, researchers and policy 
makers. 
This study is organized as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the literature on reverse takeovers 
until today. Chapter 3 describes the process of reverse takeover, the characteristics and 
the motivations of the firms that participate and the regulatory framework. Chapter 4 
describes the data and provides descriptive statistics. Chapter 5 presents the 
methodology used. Chapter 6 discusses the empirical results and Chapter 7 concludes 
the study. 
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Chapter 2 
 Literature Review 
2.1 The process of going public 
When a company starts its operations, it usually raises equity capital from a small 
number of investors. However, if it needs additional equity capital, it sells shares in a 
larger number of investors by going public. Having a public status, firms gain access to 
capital markets, increase their liquidity and the owners have the possibility to diversify 
their holdings (Gleason et al., 2005). Despite the significant benefits of going public, 
some costs are associated with this process. The legal, auditing and underwriting costs 
are considered to be the direct costs of the procedure, while the effort of the 
management to conduct this offering and the increased disclosure requirements are 
referred as indirect costs (Ritter, 1998). These benefits and costs are closely related to 
the common mechanism of going public, the Initial Public Offering.    
2.2 The characteristics of the firms that prefer alternative methods to IPO to 
go public 
Apart from the IPO process, the pertinent literature refers to some other ways of going 
public such as merging with or selling-out to an existing public firm (Aydoglou et al., 
2007).  According to Brau et al. (2003), it is an attractive opportunity for a private firm 
to be acquired by a public company and it is usually used as a means of going public by 
companies in high market-to-book industries, financial service sectors and highly 
leveraged industries. In addition, concerning the question for which reasons owners of a 
firm prefer IPO to a merger and vice versa, it was found that an IPO is a preferable 
means of going public by owners that sell shares, but are willing to maintain some 
control. On the other hand, owners that wish to quit of all of their ownership and 
control, prefer the merger process. Moreover, Poulsen and Stegemoller (2008), in a 
comparison of outright sell-outs to IPOs, find that another characteristic of the firms 
that is more possibly to sellout instead of conducting an IPO is the high information 
asymmetry. Since the level of information asymmetry is negatively related to the firm 
size (Aydoglou et al., 2007), it can be concluded that a small firm is more likely to 
reject the IPO route and prefer an alternative one.  
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Brown et al. (2005) compare the IPO process to a roll-up2. They compare one sample of 
companies that preferred the traditional IPO to go public with another sample of 
companies that used the roll-up mechanism instead. The results show that roll-ups firms 
offer poorer stock returns than the comparable IPO firms, while the operating 
performance is similar. Comparable results are also provided by Hogan et al. (2001) 
who indicate that the returns of Reverse Leveraged Buyouts (RLBOs) are lower than 
those of IPO firms. 
2.3 Reverse Takeovers versus IPOs 
Concerning reverse takeovers, the academic literature is quite limited. Gleason et al., 
(2005a) hold out an exploratory analysis of reverse takeovers by examining a sample of 
121 U.S. reverse takeovers occurred in the NASDAQ, NYSE and AMEX. Their 
findings show that public entities (shell companies) are unprofitable prior to the 
takeover and the main reason that participated in a RT is the good financial performance 
of the private firm. The motivations for private companies are the willingness for 
growth, the expansion of their operations in related or different industry sectors and the 
opportunity to go public. The authors find significantly positive abnormal returns on the 
RT announcement period, however, the post-merger performance of the new entity 
seems not to be improved. Moreover, the survival rates of the RTs are quite low, with 
only 46% of the sample firms survived two years after the event. 
In Gleason’s et al. (2005b) study, the characteristics of firms that prefer reverse 
takeovers or self-underwritten (SU) IPOs vis-à-vis traditional IPOs are examined. The 
findings reveal that in the year of listing, these firms have significantly lower ROA, 
lower balance sheet liquidity, higher probability of financial distress and higher 
financial leverage than firms that have selected the IPO path to obtain public listing. 
Two years after the event, RTs and SU firms have even lower profitability, less balance 
sheet liquidity and lower price to sales ratio than the IPO firms. Regarding the stock 
market performance after the event, RTs and SU firms seem to outperform their 
matched IPO counterparts IPO in the short term. 
The research of Aydoglou et al., (2007) is primarily focused on the characteristics of the 
public partner of the transaction, especially when this is a shell company. As it is 
explained, these companies are usually connected to stock price manipulation and 
                                                          
2 Roll up is an event where small companies of the same industry are merged in order to take advantage of 
economies of scale and to go public. 
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persistent insider trading and that’s the reason why, in recent years, RTs have attracted 
regulator’s attention. Thus, shell companies are examined as IPO alternatives and it is 
found no evidence of persistent insider trading or stock price manipulation despite the 
high information asymmetry of these firms. Moreover, Aydoglou et al., (2007)  find 
increased trading activity, statistical positive returns surrounding the announcement of 
RTs and statistically insignificant positive returns after the announcement.  
Adjei et al. (2008) use a sample of 286 RTs and 2,860 IPOs and examine the survival of 
the new entities 3 years after the event. IPOs survival rate is 73%, while that of RTs is 
58.3%. The study provides additional characteristics of the sample firms, with the most 
significant to be the fact that the reverse merger process is not used only by the firms 
that fail to meet the listing requirements to go public via IPO. It is found that only 1.4% 
of the sample could not be listed in a stock exchange through the traditional IPO 
method. 
Floros and Sapp (2009) study the shell company that participate in a reverse takeover 
and find that an 11-day abnormal return of 35.7% surrounding the announcement of RT. 
They mention that, on average, investors of shells still lose money, despite the 
significant returns obtained by the RT announcement. Regarding the type of private 
company that chooses to go public via a reverse merger with a shell, the study finds 
some common characteristics such as the very low profitability and liquidity, minimal 
assets and few capital expenditures. 
Sjostrom (2008) and Floros and Shastri (2010) argue that RTs are not really comparable 
to traditional IPOs as the former are smaller. For this reason, Floros and Shastri, (2010) 
compare RTs to penny stock Initial Public Offerings (PSIPOS), as PSIPOs are claimed 
to be more comparable than IPOs. Their results show that reverse takeover is used as an 
alternative mechanism to go public by highly information asymmetric firms that have 
low profitability, low liquidity, are in a primary stage of development and want to invest 
more in R&D. The factor that affects these firms not to choose the PSIPO path is 
probably, the large discount of their stock price encounter due to the high information 
asymmetry that characterize them and consequently, the misevaluation from outside 
investors.  
Carpentier et al., (2009) select a sample of 1,455 Canadian IPOs and RTs between 1993 
and 2003. Their purpose is to test whether regulation and disclosure have an important 
economic impact. Indeed, they find that the level of regulation and disclosure affect the 
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value and the long-term performance of the firms that go public and that shareholders’ 
wealth declines due to low listing requirements. Thus, it is preferable for an investor to 
invest in firms with full disclosure, as RT-listed firms perform poorer than IPO-listed 
firms.  
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Chapter 3 
 The Reverse Takeover process 
3.1 Description of the reverse takeover process 
After reviewing the pertinent literature for RTs, we provide some characteristics of RTs. 
Reverse takeover is considered to be the transaction where a private company is 
acquired by a public (usually a shell company) and it is the mechanism for the private 
partner to become publicly traded. 
 This is a different type of merger due to the fact that the target is searching for the 
appropriate vehicle -a shell company- to go public. In a RT process, a consulting firm 
may provide additional information for the suitable shell company. In some cases, small 
investments banking outfits or clearinghouses are hired to handle the transaction 
completely (Gleason et al., 2005). When the appropriate shell company is found and a 
financial strategy is planned, the private firm contacts the shareholders of the shell 
company to detect whether they are willing to participate in this takeover or not and 
determine the post-event ownership structure of the new entity(Brenner and Schroff, 
2004). Then, the initial agreement is signed by the two parties and the auditors of both 
firms conduct due diligence to certify the exact ownership percentage that is agreed to 
obtain each company in the new entity (Floros and Shastri, 2010). Certainly, the new 
entity is mainly owned by the private firm, since in most RTs the public company uses a 
large number of shares in order to ‘buy’ the private one and hence, the private firm 
gains interest in the shell. Thus, after the completion of the event, the new entity usually 
operates under the management of former private company. In most cases, the new firm 
takes the name of the private company or entirely new name (Dasilas et al., 2009).  
 
3.2 The motivation for Reverse Takeovers 
 The motivation for a firm to conduct a reverse takeover is not only connected to 
benefits provided by the process itself, but also to other, general advantages. More 
specifically, a private firm may be motivated for a RT because of the benefits of the 
going-public process, the advantages of undertaking a merger and the avoidance of the 
disadvantages of IPOs. 
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3.2.1 Going public 
A number of motives for RTs is associated with the going public process. Thus, a firm 
conducts a RT in order to obtain a public listing, have access in capital markets, pay its 
employees and managers in stock, obtain a more diversified shareholder base and 
enhance liquidity (Gleason et al., 2005). Valuation is another important factor that can 
influence the decision of a RT. It seems that a private firm has lower valuation in 
comparison with a public one and thus, a public listing becomes desirable. Some of the 
characteristics of the public firm that contribute to this higher valuation are higher 
liquidity, transparency and publicity (Seabury, 2008). 
3.2.2 M&As 
 As a corporate event, a RT is considered to be a merger. Mergers and acquisitions are 
undertaken by a firm usually, in order to grow and profit from synergy effects (Dasilas 
et al., 2009). If a firm wants to expand its operations in other countries, or in other 
sectors of the same industry or even in other industries, a RT is considered the ideal 
vehicle.  
Regarding the synergy effects, it is alleged that if two firms of the same industry merge, 
they can take advantage of the economies of scale. In other words, the combined firm’s 
cost per unit is lower than if the two companies operated separately and thus, the new 
entity ‘enjoys’ cost efficiency.   
3.2.3 RTs versus IPOs 
In this sub-chapter, we present the motives that are referred as the most important RT 
drivers. First and foremost, a firm conducts a RT because a public listing is desirable 
without the obligation of raising capital at the same time. Thus, since in most cases, RT 
firms access the capital markets at a later stage of their lifecycle (Gleason et al., 2005), 
this is considered to be a serious motive of a firm to undertake a RT in contrast with an 
IPO. Secondly, a private firm is motivated to conduct a RT, when the IPO process is not 
much accessible, as for example, the case of small firms. Moreover, a lot of firms prefer 
a RT to an IPO because the former is a quicker mechanism to obtain the desirable 
listing. Brenner and Schroff (2004) argue that normally an IPO needs time that reaches 
one calendar year to be completed. A RT, on the other hand, needs approximately 2 to 9 
months, or 87 days according to the sample of this study, to be completed. Brenner and 
Schroff (2004) also refer to the costs around the RTs and IPOs. An IPO needs over 
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$400,000 to be completed while an RT process requires approximately from $75,000 to 
$100,000. Finally, a private firm has motivation to choose a RT for its public listing 
because this is less likely to be cancelled out. If the two parties, the target and the 
acquirer, reach an agreement, the deal is completed. Following the IPO route, an offer 
may be not admitted due to the poor performance of the market. 
3.4 Regulation 
As it has already been mentioned, the public entity that participates in a reverse 
takeover transaction is usually a shell company. This is a type of company that usually 
has not assets or operations, probably following a bankruptcy or just because it was 
established only for the purpose of merging with another company (Aydoglou, et al., 
2007). In many cases, despite the fact that they are legal entities, these companies are 
connected to fraud and more particularly to stock price manipulation and persistent 
insider trading. Therefore, RT mechanism quite often attracts the regulatory authorities’ 
interest by starting new conversations for tightened rules around it. 
The majority of RT across Europe is concentrated in the UK market. Specifically, 145 
private firms and 153 public firms of our sample are from the United Kingdom. 
Therefore, it would be useful to examine what rules are imposed for the reverse 
takeover transaction by the UK Listing authority (UKLA). It is worth mentioning that 
UKLA is a division of Financial Service Authority (FSA) and it is the body responsible 
for regulating all securities listed in the UK financial markets. 
Under the Listing Rules (LR) that the FSA poses, investors are assumed to be protected. 
LR 5.1.1 R(1) states that in order the investors to be protected or the smooth operation 
of the market not to be jeopardized, the FSA may suspend the listing of any securities.  
Also, LR 10.6.3G proposes that an issuer’s equity shares will be suspended upon 
announcement if FSA judges that there is no sufficient information in the market about 
the proposed transaction. The necessary pieces of information to be available in the 
market are, whether the target is admitted elsewhere, the quality of information 
available and whether the issuer fills any information gap at the time of announcing 
(FSA, n.d.). Since the private company is the dominant after the transaction and the 
available information for its performance is very limited, it is very logical for FSA to be 
more suspicious about the new entity and the information that will provide. The 
commitment of fraud as persistent insider trading is very possible when there is lack of 
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the necessary information, since managers of the combined firm (insiders) have more 
information than the outside investors about the future plans of the firm. 
On January 2012, FSA published a consultation paper (CP12/2) in order to propose 
changes, among others, to the existing reverse takeover rules (FSA, 2012). These 
changes are updates of the previous rules in order to take into account the market 
development (Law, 2012). The proposed changes ensure that RT process is used only 
by eligible companies. Also, they determine the role of sponsor as the one that ensures 
that the RT companies understand the regulatory framework and provides assurance to 
the UKLA that these companies fulfill the requirements. Moreover, the role of external 
managed companies is determined and the criteria for premium listing are revised. 
Clearly enough, it looks like that the FSA tries to keep pace with market development 
and proposes updates of the existing rules, when it is necessary, in order to protect the 
investors.  
3.5 An RT Example 
After analyzing some significant aspects of RTs and the process itself, it would be 
beneficial to give an example of a completed reverse takeover transaction, in order to 
find out all these aspects practically.  
On 7th September, 2011, it was announced that Vallares PLC, a ‘blank check’ company 
founded by Tony Hayward, Nathaniel Rothschild and Julian Metherell based on the 
United Kingdom, was about to acquire the Turkish Genel Enerji AS, the largest oil 
producer in the Kurdistan region of Iraq. As Doug Youngson, an analyst at Arbuthnot 
Securities Ltd. in London, says, “Genel has good assets and their fields were some of 
the first on stream in Kurdistan The deal is good for sentiment in the region”, and this 
seems to be the main motive of Vallares to agree with this deal. While earlier in June, 
Vallares had raised $2.2 billion in a London IPO so as to fund taking over companies 
with upstream assets, it can be easily concluded that Vallares, as a blank check 
company, was established only with the purpose of merging with other companies. 
 The newly enlarged company, that was renamed to Genel Energy PLC, was obliged to 
publish a prospectus in October to get the consideration shares admitted to the standard 
listing segment of the Official List and to trading on the London Stock Exchange’ main 
market for listed securities. In the meantime, Vallares shares were suspended from 
trading. The transaction was completed on 21st November, 2011. In other words, 74 
days after the announcement, as an all-share reverse takeover. This means that Vallares 
Reverse Takeover: an alternative mechanism to go public 2012 
 
18 
 
did not pay any money, but instead issued new shares worthing $2.1 billion at a price of 
£10 per share in order to acquire 100% of Genel. Moreover, equal stakes of the 
combined business were given to the owners of the two previously separated entities.  
When the stock of Genel started trading in 21st November, 2011, it faced significant 
losses of 7% from the first day. Many analysts believed that this was an impact of 
corporate governance. Two of the major shareholders of the new entity that hold almost 
50% of its shares and were also partners of the previously Genel Enerjii, Mehmet Sepil 
and Mehmet Karamehmet had been accused in the past for insider trading and for 
uttering to a website death threats to a former business partner, respectively. (Lundgren 
and Swint, 2011; CNF, 2011) 
The conclusion that can be extracted from this example is that in a RT process, the 
public company is usually a shell company, the transaction is completed in less time 
than that needed by an IPO and the payment is usually made in stock. Among the most 
important is that the FSA rule, which says that the stock has to be suspended before the 
appropriate information is given to the public, helps in reducing the information 
asymmetry so as the stock price to reflect as much as possibly of the available 
information. Moreover tightened rules should be imposed by FSA concerning the 
requirements of the RTs firms to get listed. 
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Chapter 4 
 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
4.1 Data Sources 
The purpose of this study is to examine the wealth effects of reverse takeovers that took 
place in Europe between 1992 and 2011. The criteria applied to form the sample of RTs 
are the following. a) Both acquirer and target should be located in Europe, b) The 
transaction of RTs is completed. By imposing these criteria, the Thomson One database, 
gave us an initial sample of 339 reverse takeovers. After eliminating all RT transactions 
with missing data, we ended up in a final sample of 222 RT deals. Fundamentals and 
stock prices were derived from Bloomberg.  
4.2 Descriptive statistics 
4.2.1 Summary of sample characteristics 
Table 1 presents the frequency of the sample RTs over the period 1992-2011. 
Table 1 Distribution of reverse takeovers announcements in Europe 1992-2011 
Year of announcement Number of announcements Percent of sample
1992 1 0.45
1993 4 1.8
1994 2 0.9
1995 6 2.7
1996 5 2.25
1997 12 5.41
1998 6 2.7
1999 14 6.31
2000 17 7.66
2001 21 9.46
2002 10 4.5
2003 9 4.05
2004 8 3.6
2005 25 11.26
2006 20 9.01
2007 17 7.66
2008 14 6.31
2009 9 4.05
2010 17 7.66
2011 5 2.25
Total 222 100  
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From 1992 to 2001, the reverse takeover mechanism grows in popularity while more 
firms later choose RTs as a means of going public. Between 2002 and 2004, the number 
of RTs decline and then increases again until the outbreak of the global financial crisis 
(2008). The tech/dotcom bubble burst in 2001 that affected the IPO market looks like to 
be the reason behind the decline in RTs after 2001. While 8 private companies in 2000 
and 9 private companies in 2001 from the High technology and Telecommunications 
industry have chosen the RT process to go public, only 1 from Telecommunications 
involved in a RT in 2002. Thus, RTs pattern seems to be similar to that of IPOs and this 
refutes the misconception that RT process is useful only when the IPO market is not 
receptive. 
In Figure 1, it can be observed the similar pattern of European and global RT market. 
 
Figure 1 Reverse Takeovers in Europe and Worldwide 
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Table 2 Distribution in the same industry and in the same/different sectors 
Industry
Same Same Different 
Consumer Products and Services - - -
Consumer Staples 8 8 -
Energy and Power 11 9 2
Financials 22 12 10
Healthcare 5 4 1
High Technology 14 4 10
Industrials 6 3 3
Materials 11 10 1
Media and Entertainment 9 9 0
Real Estate 10 6 4
Retail 5 5 0
Telecommunications 5 4 1
Total 106 74 32
Sector
 
Table 2 demonstrates the distribution of RTs across industries. 106 firms involved in a 
RT, or approximately 47.75% of the sample, choose to merge with a company that 
operates in the same industry. Moreover, 74 firms operate in the same sector or in the 
same mid-industry and 32 operate in the same industry but in different sectors. This 
result proves that the motive of almost half of the RTs of the sample is to expand their 
operations within the same sector or to a complementary one and thus increase their 
market share.  
At this point, it is important to mention that most of the firms, public and private, that 
participate in the RT process come from a wide range of industries where some of them 
display good growth opportunities. This is in contrast with the popular misconception 
that the market of RTs is made up of small private firms in speculative sectors merging 
with failing public firms in low growth opportunity industries (Gleason et al., 2005).  
Table 3 indicates, among others, that 16.22% and 28.38% of the sample are private and 
public firms, respectively that are from the financial industry. Moreover, 14.41% and 
13.51% of the sample are public and private firms, respectively that belong to high 
technology industry.    
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Table 3 Distribution of the private and public firms in the various industries 
Number 
of RTs % of Sample
Number 
of RTs % of Sample
Consumer Products and 
Services 14 6.31 11 4.95
Consumer Staples 11 4.95 13 5.86
Energy and Power 18 8.11 14 6.31
Financials 36 16.22 63 28.38
Healthcare 12 5.41 7 3.15
High Technology 32 14.41 30 13.51
Industrials 21 9.46 22 9.91
Materials 19 8.56 19 8.56
Media and 
Entertainment 22 9.91 15 6.76
Real Estate 13 5.86 15 6.76
Retail 8 3.6 6 2.7
Telecommunications 16 7.21 7 3.15
Total 222 100 222 100
Private firm Public firm
 
Table 4 presents the sample distribution of RTs across countries of origin. 145 private 
firms and 153 public firms of the RTs under examination are UK companies and, 
generally, it seems that RT process is preferred more by West-European countries as 
alternative mechanism to go  public than by East- European.  
Finally, considering the motive of expansion in other countries, our results depict that 
33 out of 222 firms merge with a company from different country. This cross-border RT 
implies that the private company’s motives to merge with a company from another 
country could be the expansion of its operations to that country or its access to a 
different capital market. Specifically, 13 out of these 33 cross-border RTs are non-UK 
companies that got access in the London Stock Exchange, the largest stock exchange of 
Europe.  
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Table 4 Distribution of private and public firms by country of origin 
Private Firm Public Firm
Austria 3 2
Belgium 3 3
Czech Republic 1 -
Denmark 2 1
Finland 5 5
France 11 13
Germany 5 3
Gibraltar - 1
Ireland-Rep 3 3
Isle of Man 2 2
Italy 1 1
Jersey - 2
Luxembourg 2 1
Netherlands 3 1
Norway 6 4
Poland 3 4
Russian Fed 1 -
Spain 5 4
Sweden 13 12
Switzerland 5 6
Turkey 2 1
Ukraine 1 -
United Kingdom 145 153
Total 222 222  
 
4.2.2 The characteristics of the Public Firms 
In order to find out whether the good financial position of the private company is a 
motive for the public firm to be involved in an RT transaction, it is important to 
investigate the performance of the public entity before the event. If the performance is 
poor, then, the RT is obviously an ideal process to improve it.  
Table 5 depicts some fundamentals for the sample firms one year prior to the RT 
transaction. The results indicate that the public firm is a small capitalized firm whose 
total assets approximate 1.51 million Euros. Moreover, the negative prices of return on 
assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE) and net profit margin imply that the management 
of the public firm is completely inefficient to generate earnings by using its assets and 
thus the company is unprofitable. In addition, the average cash to total assets ratio is 
21.47% revealing the low liquidity of the firms, while the debt to total assets ratio is 
18.74%.  
Reverse Takeover: an alternative mechanism to go public 2012 
 
24 
 
To sum up, the public entity’s financial position one year prior to the event is extremely 
poor. To recover from these losses, the strong financial position of the private company 
is considered to be the most powerful motive for the public firm to be involved in a RT.  
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Table 5 Summary of the characteristics of the public firms 
No Mean Median Maximum Minimum St. Deviation
Total assets (in thousands of 
Euros) 162 1,511.839 25.109 457406 0.003 36,860.423
Market value of equity (in 
thousands of Euros) 144 974.947 14.749 50,995.471 -52.712 6,055.714
Return on Assets (%) 143 -8.83 0.038 40.247 -231.825 41.306
Return on Equity (%) 127 -11.6 2.183 111.975 -629.268 87.496
Net Profit Margin (%) 135 -126.363 0.968 51,796.057 -463100 43,896.938
Cash to Total Assets (%) 159 21.468 9.371 100 0 29.877
Debt to Total Assets (%) 162 18.742 14.517 140.63 0 22.339
No Mean Median Maximum Minimum St. Deviation
Total capitalization (in 
thousands of Euros) 91 1,244.109 12.838 29396 -10.395 4,674.045
Total equity (in thousands of 
Euros) 92 446.189 10.235 22086 -10.395 3,222.953
Book value of current 
liabilities (in thousands of 
Euros) 88 202.168 4.749 11832 0.001 1,847.962
Book value of shares 
outstanding(in thousands of 
Euros) 88 126.494 40.2 1,200.436 0 252.731
Current ratio 88 4.636 1.451 92.716 0.052 16.383
Quick ratio 88 3.361 0.936 92.151 0.004 15.313
Cash ratio 87 3.017 0.397 92.151 0.001 15.475
DPS 83 0.212 0 80 -0.076 8.942
Payout ratio (%) 39 28.35 11.671 116.11 0 30.447
Common Equity/ total assets
93 43.82 51.466 98.921 -1,833.328 199.49
Asset turnover ratio 85 0.753 0.598 3.881 0 0.853
Financial leverage 84 3.04 1.755 196.116 -43.259 22.177
Sales / total assets 90 0.705 0.45 178.333 0 18.742
EBIT(in thousands of 
Euros) 90 42.26 -0.058 4454 -25.248 561.274
EBITDA(in thousands of 
Euros) 91 83.01 0.329 5914 -7.01 770.376
EPS 93 0.47 -0.003 451 -235.813 56.008
EBIT margin (%) 73 -76.851 0.331 42.865 -470000 5,5875.151
P/E ratio 38 43.89 13.4 1,127.199 0.254 181.12
Panel A: Major financial characteristics of the public firms one year prior to the announcement
Panel B: Various ratios of the public firms one year prior to the announcement
Note: The number of observations fluctuates from ratio to ratio due to data unavailability  
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4.2.3 Summary of transaction characteristics 
Table 6 presents some characteristics of the reverse takeover transactions.  The average 
deal value to sales ratio is 26.45. This ratio indicates the deal value divided by the 
product of the percentage of the target’s shares acquired and the target’s net sales for the 
last 12 months prior to the announcement of the event3.The average (median) of the 
shares acquired through the reverse takeover transaction is 97.45% (100%), and the 
average (median) of shares owned after the transaction is 99.72% (100%). The 
interpretation of these results is that the acquirer usually did not have any ownership of 
the target prior to the reverse takeover. Moreover, the average enterprise value and the 
average equity value at the announcement are 1.647 million Euros and 958,800 Euros, 
respectively. 
Panel B of Table 6 presents information about the number of firms involved in an RT 
that request consultation from a financial advisor. It can be seen that the public firm of 
the transaction seeks for a consultation more often than the private firm does.  
Additionally, there are cases where the same firm receives consultation from more than 
one advisor.  
Table 6 also includes some names of financial advisors that participated in the reverse 
takeover transaction from the private partner’s side or/and from the public one. Large 
and well-known investment banks such as, Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sacks and, JP 
Morgan seem to be the most popular financial advisors in RT transactions.  
 
 
                                                          
3 Definition is provided by Thomson One 
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Table 6 Transaction characteristics 
Number Mean Median Maximum Minimum St. Dev
Ratio of Deal Value to Sales 118 26.45 1.322 4500 0 438.868
% of Shares Acquired 217 97.455 100 100 0.548 15.976
% Owned After Transaction 217 99.723 100 100 3.53 9.236
Enterprise value at 
Announcement (€thousands) 193 1,640.669 45.271 27,4759.5 -2,403 27,707.349
Equity Value at 
Announcement(€thousands) 192 958.801 441.055 95,824.581 0.384 9,956.995
Panel B: Financial Advisors
Private Fir
Financial Advisor 97 139
No Financial Advisor 125 83
Financial Advisors
 Rowan Dartington & Co Ltd (2)
 Lehman Brothers International (1)  Evolution Beeson Gregory (2)
 Morgan Stanley (4)  NM Rothschild & Sons Ltd (2)
 NM Rothschild & Sons Limited (2) Ermgassen & Co. (2)
 KBC Peel Hunt Ltd (4)  Brewin Dolphin Securities (3)
 KPMG (3)  Collins Stewart Ltd (4)
 Lazard (4)  Grant Thornton (7)
 Ernst & Young LLP (2)  Apax Partners & Co Ltd (2)
 Goldman Sachs & Co (7)  Arthur Andersen Corp. Fin. (2)
 JP Morgan (9)  Baker Tilly & Co (3)
 Deutsche Bank (4)  Altium Capital Limited (2)
Public Firm
Panel C: Participating Financial Advisors' Names (No of RTs)
Financial Advisors
 Deloitte & Touche Corp Finance (2)  Alfred Berg A/S (2)
Panel A: Description of the transaction characteristics
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Chapter 5 
 Methodology 
5.1 Event study methodology 
To measure the stock price reaction to the announcement of a reverse takeover we use 
the classical event study methodology. This is the most common method that 
researchers use in order to examine market efficiency and to uncover wealth effects 
surrounding announcements of corporate events. To be more specific, the current study 
examines whether the announcement of a RT, affects stock prices and consequently 
creates value for the company’s shareholders.  
As return-generating models, market model and market adjusted model are used. The 
market-adjusted model states that the ex-ante expected return on a stock is constant 
across stocks and can differ across time. The expected return for stock i in time t is 
given by (Sudarsanam, 2010): 
𝐸(𝑅𝑖𝑡) = 𝐸(𝑅𝑀𝑡)                                                                        (1) 
The Market model is given by: 
𝐸(𝑅𝑖𝑡) = 𝑎𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖𝑅𝑀𝑡          (2) 
The parameters 𝑎𝑖 and 𝑏𝑖 are estimated using the Scholes and Williams (1977) 
technique which takes into account thin trading problem, a commonly observed 
problem in shell companies. Market model parameters are estimated by regressing the 
stock returns on the market return for the estimation period that ranges from t-250 to t-
11 where t=0 is the announcement date. 
Therefore, abnormal return is the difference between the actual return and the expected 
return on the security and it should be taken as follows: 
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝐸(𝑅𝑖𝑡)         (3) 
where 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the abnormal return, 𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the realized return and, 𝐸(𝑅𝑖𝑡) is the expected 
return on security i for period t. 
By combining equation (1) and (3), we conclude that the abnormal returns based on the 
market-adjusted model are calculated as follows: 
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝑀𝑡          (4) 
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While, by combining equations (2) and (3), the abnormal returns based on the market 
model are calculated as:  
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − (𝑎𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖𝑅𝑀𝑡)         (5) 
However, using equations (4) and (5), we calculate the abnormal returns of one security. 
In order to calculate the abnormal returns of the sample, we use the formula of Average 
Abnormal Return (AAR) that is provided below: 
𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡 = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡𝑁𝑁𝑖=1           (6) 
Where 𝑁 is the number of stocks announcing a RT. 
After the calculation of the abnormal returns based on the two models, the cumulative 
abnormal returns are calculated as the sum of the abnormal returns for a specific period 
T. The formula is presented as: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑇 = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡𝑇𝑡=1          (7) 
Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are computed for the following event windows: (-
10,10), (-10,-1), (+1,+10), (-5,+5), (-5,-1), (+1,+5), (-1,+1) and (-1,0). The reason to 
compute CARs prior and post-RTs is to capture possible information leakages or 
sluggish market reaction and this check for market efficiency.  
Based on the market model, we also calculate abnormal volatility. Following Landsman 
and Maydew (2002), abnormal volatility (AVAR) is estimated as follows: 
𝐴𝑉𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡2𝜎𝑖2           (8) 
where 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡2   are the squared abnormal returns that the market model gives and 𝜎𝑖2 is the 
variance of the firm’s i market model returns that are calculated during the estimation 
period from t-250 to t-11. Abnormal volatility can take only positive values. When this 
value is below the unity, it implies a reduction in volatility, while an abnormal volatility 
that is above unity, implies an increase during the specific period.  
 
5.2 Multivariate Regression 
Probing deeper into the valuation effects of RTs, we employ cross-sectional regression 
analysis using CARs of three days (-1,1) as dependent variable. And a number of 
independent variables such as Total Assets, Return on Assets, Cash to Total Assets and 
a dummy variable that takes 1 for private and public firms belonging to different 
industries, and 0 otherwise. The selection of control variables is based on prior studies 
investigating RTs (see, for example, Gleason et al, 2005a). The main purpose of the 
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regression analysis is to figure out whether CARs are related to some characteristics of 
the acquirer. More specifically, total assets indicate the size of the bidder, while ROA 
and Cash to Total Assets measure profitability and liquidity, respectively. The dummy 
variable tests for differential price effects that exist in cases that targets and acquirers 
operate in the same industry.  
5.3 Long term performance 
Moreover, we assess the long-term performance of RTs following the deal. In 
particularly, we employ a number of financial ratios for the year in which the event 
occurred and the following two years. The basic goal of this technique is to test whether 
there is improvement in the financial performance of the RTs firms after the event. In 
order to have a general view of the sample, we calculate, mean, median, maximum, 
minimum and standard deviation of the ratios. We take into account for the existence of 
outliers by windsorizing our data by 1.5%  
 We use tests of equality to identify if there is a statistically significant change in the 
mean and median ratios surrounding the event. The comparison is made between the 
periods (-1,0), (0,1), (-1,+1) and (-1,2). The two-tailed t-statistic and the Wilcoxon 
signed rank test are used to test for differences in means and medians, respectively. 
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Chapter 6 
 Empirical results 
6.1 Stock price reaction to RTs 
Panel A of Table 7 reports the average abnormal returns of the stocks of the sample for 
each of the 20 days surrounding the event. Based on the market model, we observe 
abnormal returns of 0.842, 1.822%, 3.087% and 4.646% for days -2, -1, 0 and +1, 
respectively. All these abnormal returns are statistically significant indicating that RT 
announcements bring about significant price appreciations to public firms’ shareholders.   
The market-adjusted model, on the other hand, indicates that there are statistically 
significant abnormal returns in two days prior to the announcement and the day of the 
announcement (day 0). The mean abnormal returns for each of these days are 0.684%, 
1.799% and 2.902%, respectively. The results from both models show that the 
investors’ reaction to the announcement of a reverse takeover is very quick since the 
there is no excess returns following the event date.   
Panel B of Table 7 presents the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for several event 
windows based on both models. Market model CARs range from 3.023% to 10.629% 
for the various event windows. More particularly, for the (-1, +1) event window, the 
average CAR is 9.555%. Moreover, the lowest price of 3.023% refers to the (+1,+10) 
event window, implying that after the first days of the announcement, the returns tend to 
be more normal. It is also important to mention that all these results are statistically 
significant at the 1% level. The CARs based on market-adjusted provide quite similar 
results. They are all statistically significant except for the (+1, +10) event window and 
they range from 2.081% to 9.345%. Undoubtedly, the above results confirm that a 
reverse takeover is an event that increases the wealth of the shareholders of the public 
firm.  
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Table 7 Abnormal and Cumulative abnormal returns around reverse takeovers 
Days AAR% t-statistic AAR% t-statistic
-10 0.22 0.537 0.133 0.28
-9 0.302 0.737 0.126 0.45
-8 0.221 0.539 -0.005 -0.017
-7 0.45 1.097 0.359 1.343
-6 -0.204 -0.497 -0.096 -0.339
-5 0.267 0.65 0.285 1.186
-4 0.047 0.116 -0.113 -0.396
-3 0.383 0.933 0.324 1.416
-2 0.842** 2.052 0.684*** 2.247
-1 1.822*** 4.442 1.799*** 2.868
0 3.087*** 7.523 2.902* 1.828
1 4.646*** 11.324 4.148 1.364
2 -0.331 -0.806 -0.423 -0.711
3 -0.385 -0.939 -0.452 -1.009
4 0.039 0.095 0.006 0.021
5 0.213 0.519 0.186 0.263
6 -0.166 -0.405 -0.123 -0.373
7 -0.373 -0.908 -0.3 -1.11
8 -0.019 -0.047 -0.077 -0.255
9 -0.238 -0.58 -0.407 -1.43
10 -0.362 -0.882 -0.478 -1.18
Event Window CAAR % t-statistic CAAR % t-statistic
 (-10 +10) 10.461*** 5.564 8.478*** 4.509
 (-10 -1) 4.351*** 3.354 3.495** 2.694
 (+1 +10) 3.023** 2.33 2.081 1.604
 (-5 +5) 10.629*** 7.812 9.345*** 6.867
 (-5 -1) 3.361*** 3.664 2.978*** 3.246
 (+1 +5) 4.182*** 4.558 3.465*** 3.777
 (-1 +1) 9.555*** 13.446 8.849*** 12.452
 (-1 0) 4.909*** 8.461 4.701*** 8.101
Panel A: Abnormal Returns around RTs
Market Model Market-adjusted
Panel B: Cumulative Abnormal returns around RTs
Market Model Market-adjusted
 
Note: * indicates a significant difference from zero at the 10% level. ** indicates a significant difference 
from zero at the 5% level and *** indicates a significant difference from zero at the 1% level 
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Table 8 Abnormal Volatility around RTs 
Days AAV% t-statistic
-10 0,568*** -3,536
-9 0.611*** -2.455
-8 0.644** -2.262
-7 0.491** -2.13
-6 0.502*** -4.846
-5 0.485*** -3.058
-4 0.398*** -5.469
-3 0.368*** -6.299
-2 0.563* -1.854
-1 1.04 0.177
0 10.178*** 4.21
1 6.196*** 4.443
2 1.857* 1.717
3 1.437 1.302
4 0.592*** -4.219
5 1.266 0.496
6 0.909 -0.329
7 0.848 -0.779
8 0.734 -1.188
9 0.617* -1.891
10 0.795 -0.788  
Note: * indicates a significant difference from zero at the 10% level. ** indicates a significant difference 
from zero at the 5% level and *** indicates a significant difference from zero at the 1% level. 
 
Table 8 provides results from the abnormal volatility (AV) surrounding RTs. For the 
ten-day period prior to the event, abnormal volatility is lower than unity implying a 
reduction in volatility. The significant volatility of 10.178%  is generated on the day of 
the announcement and indicates the increased volatility due to the event. In the 
following two days, the abnormal volatility is 6.196% and 1.857%, respectively. A 
possible explanation of this increased volatility is given by Ritter (1987) who states that 
the stock price volatility post-going public is related to the uncertainty about the market 
value of the firm prior to going public. For the reverse takeover transaction, specifically, 
this means that the volatility is so high because there is little information provided for 
the private firm prior to the acquisition. Also, since it is not required to conduct 
prospectus and registration statements and there is no price stabilization activity by an 
underwriter as in the case of IPO, there is great uncertainty and post going public 
volatility of reverse takeover firms (Gleason, et al., 2005b). 
Reverse Takeover: an alternative mechanism to go public 2012 
 
34 
 
6.2 Multivariate Regression 
Table 9 presents the results from the regression analysis. As it can be observed, apart 
from the intercept, the only statistically significant variable is the logarithm of Total 
Assets (logTA) that refers to the firm size. Analytically, the coefficient of firm size is -
0.0717 and -0.0673, respectively in the two models. This means that the higher firm size 
is, the lower cumulative abnormal returns are generated due to the announcement of an 
RT. Inversely, small firms are characterized by large cumulative abnormal returns.  
As it has already been mentioned, most of the public firms of the sample that 
participated in a reverse takeover transaction are small capitalization firms mostly 
known as penny stocks or shell companies. Aydoglou et al., (2007) state that the firm 
size is negatively related to information asymmetry and thus, small firms are also highly 
information asymmetric. In the presence of information asymmetry, however, small 
companies cannot provide the public with available information about future prospects 
of the company, since they are usually not followed by analysts.  Hence, this 
information is not reflected in the share price, that is probably undervalued. Andres et 
al., (2007), in a simillar research for Leverareg Buyouts (LBOs) say that ‘it is not until 
the publication of the LBO announcement, and thus an increasing public interest that 
the stock becomes more liquid and all relevant information is incorporated in the stock 
price.’ Also, their empirical results depict this negative relationship between firm size 
and abnormal returns. 
In this study, the results of the regression analysis that is presented in Table 9, can be 
explained in a similar manner to Andres’ et al., (2007) findings. It seems that the large 
abnormal returns of the shell company’s stock are generated because the announcement 
of the reverse merger transaction attracts public’s interest and consequently, the stock 
price reflects the available information and is valued fairly.  
In another regression analysis for RTs, Gleason et al, (2005a) find that the cash to total 
assets ratio is a statistically significant variable that is positively related to the abnormal 
returns. This is interpreted as that the more liquid firms generate higher abnormal 
returns. From the same analysis, it can also be extracted, similarly to our results,  that 
the smaller firms are characterized by larger CARs, but in this case, total assets is not a 
statistically significant variable.     
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Table 9 Multivariate Regression of 3-day (-1,+1) cumulative abnormal returns 
Model Intercept
Cash/Tot
al Assets ROA LogTA Dummy R-squared
0.2168** -0.0005 0.0005     -0.0717*** -0.026 0.069 139
-25.699 -0.4042 -0.5773 (-2.6104) (-0.3895)
0.2007** 0.0007 0.0005 -0.0673** -0.0341 0.064 139
-2.373 -0.5073 -0.5529 (-2.4453) -0.61128
No of Obs.
1
2
Note: Model 1 regresses CARs (-1,+1) taken from the  market model, while Model 2, CARs from 
market-adjusted. * indicates a significant difference from zero at the 10% level. ** indicates a significant 
difference from zero at the 5% level and *** indicates a significant difference from zero at the 1% level. 
T-values are in the parenthesis. 
6.3 Long-term performance 
6.3.1 Accounting Performance 
In this section, we examine the financial performance of the new enlarged entities for 
the year in which the reverse takeover occurs and the subsequent two years.  
Looking at the firm size as measured by total assets from the year prior to the event with 
that of the year event, we observe an increase of 56.2%. In the following year, there is a 
small decline in firm size. However, in the second year, there is a similar increase to the 
first one indicating that the size of the firm has been doubled in 2 years after the reverse 
takeover. Additionally, market value of Equity is also getting larger year after year. 
Consequently, in terms of total assets and market value of equity, the firm size increases 
steadily after the reverse merger.  
Return on Equity, Return on Asset and Net Profit Margin, however, still indicate that 
these firms do not generate profits. The results of these ratios remain negative for the 
period under examination and prove the bad financial performance of these entities. 
Analytically, the negative values of Return on Asset indicate the inefficiency of these 
new entities’ management to generate earnings after the event by using their total assets. 
Return on Equity as another profitability ratio, measures how much efficient are these 
firms to generate profits from every unit of shareholders’ equity. During the whole 
period under examination, ROE takes negative values and this is not a good figure for 
the growth of the RTs, since it results in low share price and makes it difficult for the 
firms to attract new funds. Net Profit Margin, as the last profitability indicator used in 
this study, remains negative for the period under examination and verifies once again 
the bad financial performance of these entities. 
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Table 10 Summary of financial characteristics of the sample firms in the post-RT period 
No Mean Median Maximum Minimum
Standard 
Deviation
Total assets (in thousands of 
Euros) 173 2,361.697 54.7 576393 0.217 46,853.594
Market value of equity (in 
thousands of Euros) 173 1,213.470 44.267 10,7378.96 -40.468 9,818.33
Return on Assets (%) 148 -15.513 0.4613 63.614 -499.015 71.279
Return on Equity (%) 132 -15.351 1.883 109.860 -464.84 76,879
Net Profit Margin (%) 166 -127.128 -0.891 655.634 -27,735.48 2,676.191
Cash to Total Assets (%) 171 14.354 8.032 97.235 0 20.073
Debt to Total Assets (%) 173 18.863 14.668 84.8 0 20.218
Total assets (in thousands of 
Euros) 175 2,270.448 68.481 320004 0.003 29,602.1407
Market value of equity (in 
thousands of Euros) 175 1,938.161 63.821 335,286.22 -2.518 29,684.387
Return on Assets (%) 161 -5.578 1.014 44.945 -135.249 25.566
Return on Equity (%) 149 -5.618 4.436 58.065 -270.3 45.820
Net Profit Margin (%) 175 -49.132 1.833 104.931 -3,260.641 394.521
Cash to Total Assets (%) 173 12.192 6.815 100 0 17.599
Debt to Total Assets (%) 175 19.602 16.146 138.867 0 21.695
Total assets (in thousands of 
Euros) 155 3,351.747 82.882 368859 1.435 37,129.311
Market value of equity (in 
thousands of Euros) 163 2,681.365 74.468 382,056.185 -0,429 38,134.146
Return on Assets (%) 147 -4.865 0.907 39.328 -157.064 25,039
Return on Equity (%) 138 -6.445 3.348 50 -196.344 41.901
Net Profit Margin (%) 157 -17.569 1.61 183.140 -2,053.96 200.423
Cash to Total Assets (%) 154 10.313 6.133 68.663 0 13.388
Debt to Total Assets (%) 155 20.839 19.025 123.306 0 21.113
Panel A : Public entities at the end of the year in which the reverse takeover occurs
Panel B: Public entities one year after reverse takeover 
Panel C: Public entities two years after reverse takeover 
 
The liquidity of these firms is captured by the cash to total assets ratio which 
deteriorates year by year, while debt to total assets remains relatively stable in all years. 
Some other, more general characteristics of the sample can also be extracted from Table 
10. Standard deviation column shows that there is high variation in the characteristics of 
the sample firms. Moreover, maximum and minimum columns present the existence of 
extreme values that do not represent the average reverse takeover firm. In this analysis, 
in order to extract a more generalized outcome, these values have not been taken into 
Reverse Takeover: an alternative mechanism to go public 2012 
 
37 
 
consideration.  Finally, the reduced number of observations column in panel C shows 
that two years after the event, some companies didn’t survive. 
Table 11 Various Ratios in the post-RT period 
  No Mean Median Maximum Minimum Standard Deviation 
              
Panel A : Public entities at the end of the year in which the reverse takeover occurs 
Total capitalization 
(in thousands of 
Euros) 162 1551.461 37.376 306242.000 -2.065 25329.100 
Total equity (in 
thousands of Euros) 173 584.469 24.916 29747.000 -9.874 3735.752 
Book value of 
current liabilities (in 
thousands of Euros) 161 247.650 13.950 26536.000 0.011 2491.477 
Book value of shares 
outstanding(in 
thousands of Euros) 169 192.646 95.220 5160.000 0.691 503.337 
Current ratio 161 1.861 1.213 42.487 0.023 4.562 
Quick ratio 161 1.414 0.786 28.636 0 3.859 
Cash ratio 161 1.024 0.282 28.636 0 3.873 
DPS 145 0.082 0 7 0 0.871 
Payout ratio (%) 76 35.012 10.581 1958.958 0 228.051 
Common Equity/ 
total assets 173 43.161 41.731 98.662 -331.982 45.678 
Asset turnover ratio 148 0.733 0.589 4.108 0.000 0.819 
Financial leverage 148 3.367 2.383 33.957 -16.491 5.331 
Sales / total assets 173 0.593 0.394 16.371 0.000 1.366 
EBIT(in thousands 
of Euros) 164 34.804 0.397 5113.000 -750.900 506.625 
EBITDA(in 
thousands of Euros) 166 63.401 1.270 9918.000 -522.900 887.327 
EPS 176 0.081 -0.003 84.854 -11.271 6.684 
EBIT margin (%) 155 -57.641 2.091 84.424 
-
29683.870 2397.632 
P/E ratio 101 29.942 14.004 1744.026 0.350 211.274 
              
 
Panel B: Public entities one year after reverse takeover  
Total capitalization 
(in thousands of 
Euros) 168 1538.873 49.959 115409.000 -2.252 12376.323 
Total equity (in 
thousands of Euros) 175 617.475 33.544 33693.000 -13.948 4282.983 
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Book value of 
current liabilities (in 
thousands of Euros) 163 250.036 19.402 27064.800 0.011 2981.956 
Book value of shares 
outstanding(in 
thousands of Euros) 171 235.577 130.262 5432.000 0.882 630.181 
Current ratio 163 1.596 1.198 43.715 0.052 4.178 
Quick ratio 163 1.129 0.732 43.176 0.007 4.102 
Cash ratio 163 0.719 0.223 43.176 0 4.117 
DPS 156 0.116 0.000 7.500 0 0.805 
Payout ratio (%) 93 24.594 12.474 496.774 0 74.089 
Common Equity/ 
total assets 175 44.867 46.668 98.049 -1833.328 146.545 
Asset turnover ratio 160 0.869 0.774 7.755 -0.019 0.971 
Financial leverage 161 2.982 1.907 196.121 -15.638 15.962 
Sales / total assets 173 0.819 0.707 178.333 -0.023 13.529 
EBIT(in thousands 
of Euros) 166 51.343 2.269 13910.000 -395.700 1164.246 
EBITDA(in 
thousands of Euros) 167 84.591 4.564 19072.000 -249.200 1596.734 
EPS 178 0.239 0.006 16.755 -13.640 2.363 
EBIT margin (%) 165 -15.531 4.199 141.759 -1333.852 181.277 
P/E ratio 116 32.144 13.731 2967.780 0.003 283.968 
              
Panel C: Public entities two years after reverse takeover  
Total capitalization 
(in thousands of 
Euros) 151 2045.919 56.025 137797.000 -3.141 16799.456 
Total equity (in 
thousands of Euros) 155 842.695 38.531 62818.300 -37.256 6869.226 
Book value of 
current liabilities (in 
thousands of Euros) 144 300.460 22.719 52009.600 0.294 4895.175 
Book value of shares 
outstanding(in 
thousands of Euros) 150 227.174 114.520 5476.000 3.800 627.765 
Current ratio 144 1.434 1.190 24.524 0.120 2.513 
Quick ratio 144 0.987 0.789 24.416 0.009 2.370 
Cash ratio 144 0.551 0.233 23.805 0 2.357 
DPS 143 0.155 0.000 8.000 0 0.909 
Payout ratio (%) 87 31.550 27.065 356.425 0 56.993 
Common Equity/ 
total assets 155 44.679 45.310 95.569 -88.634 30.008 
Asset turnover ratio 146 0.856 0.824 3.610 0.000 0.724 
Financial leverage 147 2.954 2.027 38.790 -40.203 6.662 
Sales / total assets 154 0.831 0.714 3.079 0.000 0.692 
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EBIT(in thousands 
of Euros) 147 66.946 3.591 12550.000 -274.953 1176.156 
EBITDA(in 
thousands of Euros) 148 107.917 5.902 17650.000 -111.835 1680.864 
EPS 157 0.218 0.012 43.787 -17.140 4.288 
EBIT margin (%) 147 -7.342 3.940 87.468 -1142.424 113.964 
P/E ratio 115 28.452 13.595 6159.291 0.515 580.099 
 
Table 11 presents a detailed description of the post-RT operating performance of the 
RTs firms. Panels A, B and C provide various ratios for the year of the event, and the 
subsequent two years (year +1 and year +2). This table’s results are comparable to those 
of Panel B of Table 4, where the same ratios are presented for the year prior to the 
reverse takeover.  
Total capitalization and capital structure seem to increase slightly in year 0 and decrease 
in year +1. This verifies once again that private firms’ primary motive to conduct a 
reverse takeover is not to access the capital markets immediately, but to get a public 
listing. 
Total equity increases steadily year by year, but still remains a small portion of the total 
capitalization. This indicates that RTs firms, in order to finance their operations, use 
primarily short-term and long-term debt as a source of fund, and thus being highly 
levered. The behavior of the financial leverage ratio verifies this conclusion. Debt is 
more than double from equity capital, since its value is above 2. Moreover, book value 
of current liabilities and book value of shares outstanding increase gradually year by 
year. 
In order to identify whether the RTs firm have the liquidity to pay their short-term 
obligations, current ratio is used. It is calculated by dividing current assets to current 
liabilities. It seems that its value decreases the year 0 and the following year as well. 
There is a small increase in the second year after the event, but still seems that there are 
liquidity problems. Quick ratio is another measure of liquidity which presents a 
downward trend. More specifically, two years after the reverse takeover, its value is 
below unity implying that the RTs firms are unable to pay off their obligations.  
Dividend per share (DPS) is 0.212 Euros the year prior to the event and falls to 0.081 
Euros the year in which the reverse takeover took place. In subsequent two years, DPS 
increases again. Payout ratio fluctuates around 30% for the periods under examination 
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that is quite low and implying a very conservative dividend policy. In any case, only 
mature companies appear to offer a higher payout ratio. 
The value of asset turnover ratio is 0.733 for the year 0 implying that investing 1 Euro 
in assets, it generates 0.733 Euros in revenues. It is undoubtedly an element of 
inefficiency observed in the following years as well. The inefficiency is additionally 
verified by the sales to total assets ratio that follows similar pattern. 
Summarizing, the RT firms continue having poor financial performance after the 
reverse takeover and only in few cases a slight improvement is observed. Our results are 
consistent with the results of Gleason et all, (2005a). Their study reveals that the new 
entities the year in which the event occurs and for 1 and 2 years after the event are 
getting larger, continue having negative values in various profitability ratios and are 
characterized by decreasing cash liquidity and increasing debt ratios.  
6.3.2 Test of equality 
To have a clear view of whether the performance of a ratio substantially changes, test of 
equality is also performed in mean and median. Results from equality testing are shown 
in Tables 12 and 13.  
Table 12 indicates that there is statistically significant difference in means in the period 
(0, +1) for Return on Asset, Return on Equity and Profit Margin. As it was stated 
before, these 3 ratios have negative values before and after the reverse takeover. 
However, the test of equality shows that there is a change after the event, that despite 
the fact that they are still negative, they are slightly improved. The cash to total assets 
ratio worsens in year 0 and the following years.  It is observed that the mean of the cash 
ratio of the year prior to the event (year -1), is not the same with the means of each of 
the following two years. Regarding to debt to total assets ratio, p-value indicates that the 
null hypothesis of no change cannot be rejected. 
Table 13 presents results from three liquidity ratios, that are, current, quick and cash. 
Tests of equality in medians for the three ratios indicate that there are statistically 
significant changes when we compare their results from the period prior to the event to 
the results of the first and the second year after the merger. This verifies that the new 
entities face decreasing liquidity year after year. Panels D and E shows that sales to total 
assets and earnings per share decrease after the event since there is a statistically 
significant difference in the medians from year 0 to year +1.     
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Table 12 Mean and Median of fundamentals surrounding the announcement of RT 
Years -1 0 1 2 Period (-1.0) (0.+1) (-1. +1) (-1. +2)
Mean -12.044 -22.549 -7.452 -6.816 Change 10.505 -15.097 -4.592 -5.228
Median 0.038 0.461 1.014 0.907 P-value 0.127 0.012** 0.239 0.192
positive 72 76 95 86 Wilcoxon p-value 0.6693 0.2661 0.4386 0.5368
N 143 148 161 147
Years -1 0 1 2 Period (-1.0) (0.+1) (-1. +1) (-1. +2)
Mean -19.514 -21.360 -9.037 -9.097 Change 1.845 -12.322 -10.477 -10.417
Median 2183 1883 4.436 3348 P-value 0.857 0.099* 0.205 0.212
positive 67 70 92 84 Wilcoxon p-value 0.6825 0.4688 0.6862 0.9482
N 127 132 149 138
Years -1 0 1 2 Period (-1.0) (0.+1) (-1. +1) (-1. +2)
Mean -5214.2 -468.7 -98.1 -37.3 Change -4745.5 -370.6 -5116.1 -5176.9
Median 0.968 -0.891 1.833 1610 P-value 0.1655 0.071* 0.124 0.1405
positive 75 82 100 94 Wilcoxon p-value 0.1262 0.0926 0.9883 0.831
N 135 166 175 157
Years -1 0 1 2 Period (-1.0) (0.+1) (-1. +1) (-1. +2)
Mean 22.541 15.805 13.598 11.107 Change 6.736 2.208 8.944 11.435
Median 9371 8032 6.815 6133 P-value 0.016** 0.279 0.001*** 0***
positive 155 169 172 151 Wilcoxon p-value 0.4374 0.1984 0.071* 0.015**
N 159 171 173 154
Years -1 0 1 2 Period (-1.0) (0.+1) (-1. +1) (-1. +2)
Mean 202.107 19.855 20.977 22.090 Change 0.35573 -1.122 -0.766 -1.879
Median 145169 14668 16.146 19025 P-value 0.8785 0.618 0.750 0.443
positive 123 147 156 140 Wilcoxon p-value 0.6055 0.5824 0.3027 0.108
N 162 173 175 155
Panel A: Return on Asset surrounding the announcement of RT year
Panel B: Return on Equity surrounding the announcement of RT year
Panel C: Profit Margin surrounding the announcement of RT year
Panel D: Cash to Total Assets surrounding the announcement of RT year
Panel E: Debt to Total Assets surrounding the announcement of RT year
Note: * indicates a significant difference from zero at the 10% level. ** indicates a significant difference 
from zero at the 5% level and *** indicates a significant difference from zero at the 1% level.  
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Table 13 Mean and Median of other various ratios surrounding the RT 
Years -1 0 1 2 Period (-1.0) (0.+1) (-1. +1) (-1. +2)
Mean 9.192 2.412 2.101 1.709 Change 6.781 0.310 7.091 7.483
Median 1313 1213 1.198 1190 P-value 0.063* 0.523 0.05** 0.051*
positive 149 161 163 144 Wilcoxon p-value 0.079* 0.8999 0.054* 0.012***
N 149 161 163 144
Years -1 0 1 2 Period (-1.0) (0.+1) (-1. +1) (-1. +2)
Mean 479.103 1.889 1.637 1.246 Change 290.229 0.251 3.154 3.545
Median 0.8298 0.786 0.732 0.789 P-value 0.007*** 0.571 0.003*** 0.001***
positive 149 160 163 144 Wilcoxon p-value 0.2077 0.6138 0.068* 0.051*
N 149 161 163 144
Years -1 0 1 2 Period (-1.0) (0.+1) (-1. +1) (-1. +2)
Mean 446.015 1.508 1.233 0.821 Change 295.215 0.275 3.227 3.640
Median 0.359 0.282 0.223 0.233 P-value 0.0006*** 0.536 0.003*** 0.001***
positive 145 159 162 142 Wilcoxon p-value 0.2833 0.1238 0.017** 0.007***
N 149 161 163 144
Years -1 0 1 2 Period (-1.0) (0.+1) (-1. +1) (-1. +2)
Mean 187.422 0.709 1.924 0.859 Change 116.498 -1.215 -0.050 1.016
Median 0.5271 0.394 0.707 0.714 P-value 0.2838 0.241 0.974 0.376
positive 133 161 169 151 Wilcoxon p-value 0.9719 0.0007*** 0.009*** 0.004***
N 157 173 173 154
Years -1 0 1 2 Period (-1.0) (0.+1) (-1. +1) (-1. +2)
Mean 1.977 0.525 0.331 0.366 Change 1.452 0.194 1.646 1.611
Median -0.002 -0.003 0.006 0.012 P-value 0.220 0.716 0.125 0.170
positive 72 80 100 91 Wilcoxon p-value 0.3894 0.045** 0.2537 0.2138
N 163 176 178 157
Panel B: Quick Ratio surrounding the announcement of RT year
Panel C: Cash Ratio surrounding the announcement of RT year
Panel D: Sales to Total Assets surrounding the announcement of RT year
Panel E: Earnings per share surrounding the announcement of RT year
Panel A: Current Ratio surrounding the announcement of RT year
 Note: * indicates a significant difference from zero at the 10% level. ** indicates a significant difference 
from zero at the 5% level and *** indicates a significant difference from zero at the 1% level. 
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Chapter 7 
 Conclusions and Recommendations 
During the last decades, many firms have chosen to go public through alternative 
mechanisms to IPOs such as reverse takeovers. A reverse takeover refers to the event 
where a private firm is acquired by a public one, in order to obtain its public status. 
Although, it seems that the public firm is the bidder, in fact the private firm is the 
aggressor that starts the negotiations for the merger and that’s the reason why this 
process is called reverse. 
Despite of the growing popularity of reverse takeover in the last years, the majority of 
companies still prefer to go public via an IPO. However, the research on reverse 
takeovers remains largely under-researched. The current study contributes to the 
ongoing debate on the wealth effects of RTs by providing evidence from Europe, a 
market totally so far unexplored. The results are expected to provide answers regarding 
the value relevance of RTs and uncover the drivers of such corporate actions.  
Our results demonstrate that the reverse takeover is not a mechanism of going public for 
firms when the IPO market sours, but both markets follow similar patterns and are 
affected by the same events as the dotcom bubble. By analyzing more closely some 
other characteristics of the participating firms, many useful results were extracted. We 
argue that the major motive of both firms participating in the transaction is growth 
since, in most of the cases, the private and the public firm operated in the same industry. 
For the public entity, particularly, this seems to be an opportunity to improve its 
financial performance since the public firms displays a very poor performance prior to 
the event.   
The empirical results of the research indicate that the reverse takeover process is a 
value-creation event, producing statistically significant abnormal returns surrounding 
the announcement. For a firm with market value of 1.51 million Euros, as the average 
public firm of the sample, a cumulative abnormal return of 10.629% for (-5, +5) event 
window increases its market value for almost 161,000 Euros and this signifies the 
increase in the wealth of shareholders. Moreover, RTs provoke significant abnormal 
volatility of 10.178% on the day of announcement.  
The results from the cross-sectional regression analysis show that firm size is negatively 
related with abnormal returns of the public firm. This means that the smaller the 
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company, the higher the cumulative abnormal returns on RTs announcements. A 
possible explanation of this relationship in based on the information asymmetry. Since 
small companies are also highly information asymmetric, investors may not be provided 
with the appropriate information about the private firm and thus the stock is 
undervalued prior to the event.  
In addition, we examine the long pre- and post-RT operating performance surrounding 
the year of event (year 0). The results show little post-merger improvement. This is also 
verified by the tests of equality.  
This study could be further expanded by investigating some crucial matters that have 
been raised. It is stated above that the cumulative abnormal returns increase the wealth 
of the shell company’s shareholders. However, it is not answered whether an investor 
should buy shares of a firm that was established with the purpose of merging with 
another firm, so as to take advantage of these high cumulative abnormal returns, or not. 
In other words, whether these abnormal returns are significant gains for the shareholders 
or just recover some of the shareholders’ losses. Also, some other characteristics of the 
long term performance of the new entities, such as the stock price performance and the 
survival rates of them in the long run, would give a full picture of the reverse takeover 
results. Finally, it would be very interesting to study the wealth effects of reverse 
takeovers with those of IPOs.  
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